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Abstract
Background: Systemic and structural issues of rapid response system (RRS) models can hinder implementation. 
This study sought to understand the ways in which acute care clinicians (physicians and nurses) experience and 
negotiate care for deteriorating patients within the RRS. 
Methods: Physicians and nurses working within an Australian academic health centre within a jurisdictional-based 
model of clinical governance participated in focus group interviews. Verbatim transcripts were analysed using 
thematic content analysis.
Results: Thirty-four participants (21 physicians and 13 registered nurses [RNs]) participated in six focus groups 
over five weeks in 2014. Implementing the RRS in daily practice was a process of informal communication and 
negotiation in spite of standardised protocols. Themes highlighted several systems or organisational-level barriers 
to an effective RRS, including (1) responsibility is inversely proportional to clinical experience; (2) actions around 
system flexibility contribute to deviation from protocol; (3) misdistribution of resources leads to perceptions of 
inadequate staffing levels inhibiting full optimisation of the RRS; and (4) poor communication and documentation 
of RRS increases clinician workloads. 
Conclusion: Implementing a RRS is complex and multifactorial, influenced by various inter- and intra-professional 
factors, staffing models and organisational culture. The RRS is not a static model; it is both reflexive and iterative, 
perpetually transforming to meet healthcare consumer and provider demands and local unit contexts and needs. 
Requiring more than just a strong initial implementation phase, new models of care such as a RRS demand good 
governance processes, ongoing support and regular evaluation and refinement. Cultural, organizational and 
professional factors, as well as systems-based processes, require consideration if RRSs are to achieve their intended 
outcomes in dynamic healthcare settings.
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Implications for policy makers
• Appreciate the importance of local, contextual factors, and model elements in implementing rapid response systems (RRSs).
• Organisational policy should ensure communication and negotiation via ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and coaching of health professionals.
• Ongoing training and evaluation of physicians’ roles in RRSs is critical to ensuring patient safety.
• Creation of smaller dedicated RRS teams that inhabit these roles for a longer period will enable ongoing training and support for the physician 
role and consolidation of skills.
• Prioritise inter-professional education and teams to increase understanding of the unique role and contribution of professional groups to the 
clinical encounters.
Implications for the public
The rapid response system (RRS) concept focuses on the ‘rescue’ of patients showing abnormal signs and symptoms, preventing adverse clinical 
events. The way in which clinicians operate within such a system depends partly on their perception of its value as a tool for patient safety, as well as 
ways in which they engage and effectively communicate within and between professional disciplines. Failing to activate a RRS can risk patient safety 
and lead to adverse health outcomes. This study has identified an absence of ongoing training and evaluation of physicians’ roles in the RRS and the 
importance of teamwork and communication in ensuring patient safety. 
Key Messages 
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Background 
Hospitals are facing increasing patient demand and 
complexity whilst also being more accountable for improving 
care, decreasing costs, optimising access to evidence-based 
treatments and minimising adverse events.1 An increased 
emphasis on clinician accountability to improve healthcare 
quality and safety is challenging in an environment with 
significant workforce shortages and variations in skill mix.2 
As part of the global patient quality and safety agenda, the 
past two decades have seen a growing focus on implementing 
rapid response systems (RRSs) to facilitate early detection, 
management and escalation of deteriorating inpatients.3 The 
RRS is designed around early ‘rescue’ of patients showing 
abnormal physiological signs and symptoms, preventing 
adverse clinical events (ie, unplanned intensive care unit 
(ICU) admissions, unexpected cardiopulmonary arrests and/
or deaths).4,5 Despite the progressive uptake of RRSs, various 
provider and systems factors have limited optimisation.6 The 
lack of translation of key principles highlights the need to 
consider interpersonal, intra-organisational, and systemic 
factors including workforce distribution, skills and shortages, 
culture, teamwork, power relationships, fiscal constraints, 
increasing public accountability7 and competition between 
discrete organisational units.8 Teamwork and communication 
are essential in ensuring patient safety.9 Team building is 
complex and influenced by professional boundaries, power 
relations and systems.10 As with any healthcare initiative, 
human factors and the understanding of interactions among 
individuals and elements of a system, may influence the level 
of acceptance, utilisation and ultimately, the effectiveness 
of RRSs within the acute care setting.11 The ways in which 
clinicians operate within the RRS depend partly on the extent 
to which they value its use as a tool for patient safety, as well 
as ways in which they engage and effectively communicate 
within and between professional disciplines. Despite the no 
blame feature of all safety and quality agendas, clinician fear 
of retribution often shapes reluctance to activate RRSs.12-14 
Clarifying interactions and experiences that occur between 
clinicians operating within these mandated clinical systems 
is required to address known gaps. Frameworks in healthcare 
and institutional structures are still largely shaped by 
historical, medically dominated hierarchies15-17 challenging 
communication and innovation. Failing to acknowledge these 
human factors is detrimental to success when implementing 
any model of care.7
Current literature reports on barriers to effective RRS 
activation, including RRS knowledge, attitude of responders 
and workloads.18 This study further aimed to explore and 
understand how doctors and nurses experience this system 
and negotiate care for deteriorating patients within the RRS 
environment. Our objectives were to ascertain (1) factors 
that influence implementation and ongoing effective use of 
RRS and (2) clinicians’ perceptions of its efficacy and utility 
when the initial tier of medical response is led by the patient’s 
admitting team.
Methods
The study setting was an Australian academic health centre 
within a jurisdictional-based model of clinical governance. 
Box 1. Semi-structured Focus Group Topic Guide
•	 What factors in your ward make it easy/difficult to care for 
‘sick’ patients whose condition deteriorates?
•	 Can you tell me how the rapid response system (RRS) works 
on your ward? 
•	 What has been your experience with the RRS?
•	 Do you follow the Clinical Emergency Response System 
Protocol? 
♦	 If NO - how do you negotiate to operate outside of the 
Clinical Emergency Response System Protocol?
♦	 If YES – what enables you to operate within the Clinical 
Emergency Response System Protocol?
•	 In your experience, what makes the RRS work effectively/
ineffectively?
•	 What, if any, changes are needed to enhance the existing 
RRS? 
The RRS had been in place for 5 years at the time the study 
took place and received between 250-400 activations per 
month. Purposive sampling was used to recruit nurse and 
physician participants who were employed at this site and had 
current knowledge of and actively participated in RRSs.19 
A qualitative design was used to elicit perspectives of 
participants. We intended to facilitate discussion and 
narratives of experiences to understand clinicians’ meanings 
and motivations that informed their actions. Given the 
centrality of inter-professional perspectives of teams in our 
study, six discipline-specific and multi-disciplinary focus 
groups were undertaken during April and May 2014 to 
identify registered nurses’ (RNs) and physicians’ perceptions 
and experiences of the RRS.20 Focus groups were used to 
generate dynamic discussion and responses to participants’ 
comments, prompt memories, and refine opinions already 
expressed. As nurses and physicians have their own distinct 
cultures, histories, and approaches to teamwork, conducting 
several discipline-specific focus groups allowed investigation 
of roles and practice and for open dialogue and disclosure of 
potentially diverse perspectives.15 Owing to time constraints, 
some clinicians were unable to attend discipline-specific 
groups and chose to attend a multi-disciplinary group 
comprising both physicians and nurses. This choice allowed 
for individual narratives as well as responses and elaborative 
comments from others within each type of group. A literature 
review and preliminary discussions with key stakeholders 
informed development of the semi-structured topic guide 
(Box 1).2,21,22 Topics included barriers and facilitators to caring 
for deteriorating patients, RRS experiences, operating within 
and outside of the RRS protocol, and perceived need for 
protocol changes. 
The Rapid Response Model 
Track and trigger systems are recognised both nationally and 
internationally as best practice models. They take many forms 
with triggers typically incorporating numerical (aggregate 
weighted) scoring, vital sign parameters or combinations of 
both.23,24 The rapid response model utilised in the study is a 
state-based multi-tiered vital sign parameter track and trigger 
system.23 Individual tiers are activated when a pre-determined 
set of clinical observation and vital sign variables are breached 
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(track), which then ‘triggers’ the response of the appropriate 
level of rapid response team (RRT).25 The two tiers, ‘Clinical 
Review’ (Tier 1) consist of more sensitive trigger indicators 
(early warning signs), while ‘Rapid Response’ (Tier 2) 
contains less sensitive indicators indicative of late warning 
signs. Indicators are derived from research outcomes of the 
‘SOCCER’ study,26 each attracting differing levels of clinician 
response (Table 1). This allows a degree of individual 
facility autonomy based on RRS structure, resourcing, and 
geographic location. Tier parameter criteria can be modified 
to create individual patient customisation, affectively making 
indicators more or less sensitive to system activation over the 
standardised criteria. The response processes are primarily 
based around initial medical response (in the Rapid Response 
tier) coming from admitting medical teams, or dedicated 
facility physicians out of normal business operating hours. 
Although not alone in adopting this type of response model, 
the majority of peer facilities more popularly initiate this 
level of medical response in the first (Clinical Review) tier, 
dispatching a critical care lead medical emergency team 
(MET)13 when Rapid Response criteria are breached.27 The 
Clinical Review tier is generally responded to and managed 
by unit RNs in the study facility who perform a thorough 
A-G (airway, breathing, circulation, disability, exposure, 
fluids, glucose) patient assessment within 30 minutes, initiate 
required interventions within their scope of practice, and 
escalate to the second tier if their assessment reveals possible 
or actual clinical deterioration. The admitting team model 
was chosen by this facility as it allows admitting physicians to 
initially manage the patient’s deterioration, thus, decreasing 
workload demands on individuals as the RRS response load is 
spread across many speciality teams, rather than just a single 
MET. This model was also intended to allow admitting teams 
opportunity to develop skills in identifying and managing 
clinical deterioration themselves through experience rather 
than relying on the MET for ‘rescue’ in every RRS situation. 
The admitting, or after-hours team registrar (a physician 
who has obtained full registration with the Medical Board of 
Australia with at least 3 years’ experience working in public 
hospital service),28 is required to respond to all second tier 
calls within 30 minutes of activation. A junior resident medical 
officer (physician who has obtained full registration with the 
Medical Board of Australia)28 is allocated to each clinical 
floor and is also required to attend. A third tier (Code Blue) 
is embedded within the Rapid Response tier and activates 
the MET from ICU if clinicians feel that immediate critical 
care assessment is required, there has been no physician 
response from a rapid response activation, or the patient is 
not showing sign of stabilisation or improvement 1 hour after 
rapid response intervention.
Recruitment
We sent invitations to attend focus groups to all nurses and 
physicians employed at the site via administrative email 
distribution lists. In addition, advertisements posted on 
hospital notice boards sought clinician volunteers. Although 
this method enabled significant reach, it precluded our 
ability to establish a response rate. Individuals were included 
if they were a nurse or physician employed at the study site 
and currently worked in clinical environments where the 
RRS operated. Interested potential participants contacted 
the principal researcher who provided additional oral and 
written study information. Recruitment ceased upon data 
saturation. As the principal researcher was a senior nurse 
within the facility and had a working relationship with many 
of the potential participants and a significant role within 
the RRS, an external experienced clinician and researcher 
(JLP) conducted the focus groups to minimise researcher 
Table 1. RRS Tiers23
Tier Responder Actions
Clinical Review 
(yellow zone)
2 RNs (one of which must be considered 
a Senior RN)
*Senior RN is subjective and not formally 
agreed upon in facility protocol. In 
the situation of responding to Clinical 
Review, it pertains to the nurse in charge 
of the unit or the most senior RN in 
years of experience rostered on shift 
•	 Complete a full A-G (airway, breathing, circulation, disability, exposure, fluids, 
glucose) physical assessment on the patient within a 30-minute timeframe. 
•	 If clinically stable and not at risk of deterioration, then increase vital sign frequency 
and monitor for trends to unit Rapid Response (red zone) criteria. 
•	 If possible clinical deterioration or you are concerned/worried, then escalation 
is required to either RRS or Code Blue levels (depending on the patient’s clinical 
status).
•	 Nurses are also required to perform any nursing intervention they feel is warranted 
within their scope of practice. If the nurse’s assessment indicates.
Rapid Response 
(red zone)
Patient’s admitting or primary care 
medical team (during business hours or 
Medical Registrar at all other times) plus 
allocated RRS Resident Medical Officer
•	 Complete a full A-G physical assessment on the patient within a 30-minute 
timeframe.
•	 Institute therapies/interventions.
•	 Document a medical management plan including altering any calling criteria if 
necessary and an escalation plan if continued/further deterioration occurs.
•	 Escalate to Code Blue tier if: 
- Patient if at clinical risk of any life threatening condition and requires immediate 
intervention.
- Allocated Medical Officer has not arrived within 30 minutes of call activation. 
- Patient continues to breach rapid response calling criteria 1 hour post intervention.
- You are concerned/worried.
Code Blue
ICU led team of ICU/Anaesthetics 
Registrars and Critical Care Nurses
•	 Immediate response to the patient.
•	 Institute any management required including advanced treatments and/or 
resuscitation.
Abbreviations: RN, registered nurse; RRS, rapid response eystem; ICU, intensive care unit.
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and response bias. This individual, also a senior nurse, was 
neither known to participants, nor was a usual collaborator 
of the principal researcher, but had an understanding of and 
previous affiliation with the facility. Another experienced 
researcher moderated one group due to schedule conflict of 
the principal moderator; this person also performed the role 
of scribe in the other groups to record observational notes. 
Participants were informed that the principal researcher 
would not be attending the focus groups, but would have 
access to the recordings and conduct analysis. They were 
assured that names and identifying information would be 
removed from transcripts and demographic information 
would only be reported in aggregate form. They were also 
assured that the principal researcher would take steps to 
ensure confidentiality of participants including secure 
storage of data and act in accordance with established 
ethical frameworks. Prior to focus group commencement, 
all participants provided written informed consent including 
permission to audio record proceedings. 
Procedure
One-hour focus groups took place on weekdays at the 
designated health facility in a private meeting room to enable 
attendance of target groups. Throughout the focus groups, 
the moderator noted newly emerging topics and points in 
need of clarification that were re-visited prior to concluding 
the sessions along with a summary of main points. This step 
enabled participants to verify the moderator’s understanding 
and interpretation of reports, thus, acting as one method to 
verify findings. 
Analysis
All focus groups were audio recorded and transcribed 
verbatim to facilitate thematic content analysis.29 Analysis 
began with the principal researcher closely reading each 
transcript and listening to the audio recordings to get a 
sense of the proceedings and context. Transcripts were 
analysed using the general inductive approach.30 Inductive 
coding began with line-by-line reading and coding of raw 
data without a pre-specified framework to remain open to 
emergent topics and multiple meanings within the text. Coded 
text was grouped into categories of material reflecting similar 
topics. Categories were then synthesised into themes and 
independently reviewed by two additional researchers (JRT 
and MD). To facilitate analytical rigour, three analysts (1) 
principal researcher (experienced clinician perspective and 
context/topic expert), (2) principal moderator (experienced, 
yet detached clinician perspective and witness to focus 
group processes), and (3) external qualitative researcher 
(methodological expertise) posed contradictory viewpoints 
and new insights and contributed to consolidation of themes. 
This analytical triangulation facilitated capture of key aspects 
of the themes assessed to be most important and useful in 
answering the research questions.
Results 
Thirty-four health professionals (21 physicians, 13 RNs) 
took part in six focus groups over a five-week period (Table 
2). Each group was comprised of two to five participants 
with the exception of the registrar group, which included 15 
participants. Four groups were discipline-specific and two 
groups were multi-disciplinary. Participants included both 
junior and senior RNs and physicians. Participants held 
differing skill levels and clinical experience ranging from less 
than one year to greater than 10 years (Table 3). Physicians 
had worked in both admitting specialty teams and facility-
wide ‘after hours’ roles. The majority of participants were 
under 30 years old and had worked at the study facility for 
less than five years. 
Analyses of focus group data yielded a range of organisational 
and systems-level factors shaping the ways in which health 
professionals experienced and negotiated care for deteriorating 
patients within the RRS environment. The themes that reflect 
systems or organisational-level barriers to an effective RRS 
include (1) responsibility is inversely proportional to clinical 
experience; (2) actions around system flexibility contribute 
to deviation from protocol; (3) misdistribution of resources 
leads to perceptions of inadequate staffing levels inhibiting 
full optimisation of the RRS; and (4) poor communication 
and documentation of RRS increases clinician workload.
Responsibility Is Inversely Proportional to Clinical Experience 
Interns and resident medical officers (hereafter, junior 
physicians) reported feeling unprepared and out of their 
Table 2. Focus Group Composition
Focus Group Physician Participants Nurse Participants
1 0 5
2 3 0
3 0 4
4 2 2
5 2 1
6 15 0
Table 3. Participant Demographicsa
Medicalb Nursingc
Years Working at the Study Facility  
<5 21 8
>5 0 5
Years Working in Profession  
*Participants not responded (n = 2)
0 to 5 17 3
>5 2 10
Type of Employment  
*Participants not responded (n = 1)
Full time 19 11
Part time 1 2
Age
*Participants not responded (n = 1)
>30 14 3
>30 6 10
Male 8 0
Female 13 13
a Total participants (n = 34).
b Medical participants (n = 21): registrars (n = 15), residents (n = 5), and 
Interns (n = 1).
c Nursing participants (n = 13): managers (n = 1), consultants (n = 1), 
educators (n=6), and registered nurses (RNs) (n = 5).
*Note: Figures based on available data, some participants did not provide all 
demographic information requested.
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depth when they entered clinical settings. They were 
confused about the logistics of the RRS process, particularly 
around who should attend RRS calls and where (allocated 
areas). Despite the RRS protocol and process included as part 
of facility orientation, some junior physician participants 
remained unaware. This lack of understanding contributed 
to doctors developing their own unique way of making the 
system work and/or introducing the RRS processes from 
previous employment sites. This resulted in doctors frequently 
deviating from standardised RRS protocol and perpetuating 
confusion for other team members. 
Operation of Medical Response Tier Left to Most Junior 
Physicians
Tier 2 of the local RRS requires senior physicians (registrar 
level and above) to be primary responders, with junior 
physicians attending as additional support and to gain learning 
opportunities. Junior participants reported often being first 
at the bedside, and on occasion, the only responder. Despite 
study site protocol dictating activation of a MET call in such 
instances, they were often unsure of their options if they 
were the only responder. These participants reported feeling 
anxious, isolated and uncertain, out of their depth, and fearful 
of being unsupported, as depicted in the following excerpt: 
“There are times that I felt quite out of depth….I’m still 
getting anxious when my pager goes off and says ‘it’s time to 
go and do a [rapid response] and it’s like ooooooh [nervous]” 
[Junior physician].
Similarly, RN participants expressed concern around 
variability of junior physicians’ skill levels in managing the 
complexity of some deteriorating patients. Nurses’ concerns 
about clinical capabilities was amplified if they perceived 
the junior physicians as not always having the prerequisite 
specialist knowledge of particular medical conditions or 
circumstances around deterioration, considering this as 
possibly detrimental to patient safety: 
“…I say ‘do you know anything about VADs (ventricular 
assist devices)?,’ and they (junior physicians) turn around 
to me and say ‘no’, I’m really concerned, and I’ll guarantee 
the majority of the Junior Reg’s (Registrars) know nothing 
about VAD patients either…If you’re running a hospital with 
VADs and (heart) transplants and lung transplants and 
haematology patients you shouldn’t have a junior doctor 
looking after them at night, it can be quite scary” [RN].
Amidst these circumstances, nurses often perceived that 
their medical colleagues were reluctant to escalate the rapid 
response to a higher tier when they were ‘out of their depth’ 
for fear of being viewed as clinically inept. Medical reluctance 
to seek expert support was particularly apparent at night 
where junior physicians feared incurring the wrath of more 
senior specialist staff if they perceived to have disturbed them 
unnecessarily. 
“…but if you push and push (for escalation) they (junior 
physicians) will call them (Senior Specialists) eventually 
because we stand our ground… but if, as you say, we have a 
lot of junior staff (nurses) on, and you haven’t got experienced 
shift leaders on, it’s very difficult to get beyond that” [RN].
Nurses also empathised with the anxiety and complexity 
that physicians must face when they are required to attend a 
RRS call. 
 “I’m sure it must be very hard for them too, going from unit 
to unit…If you were doing it all the time then I would have 
thought you would end up with good skills, but just doing 
it for a short period or as a fill in, it sounds as if it could be 
quite tricky” [RN]. 
Concerns about junior nursing staff ’s abilities to perform 
critical roles in the RRS if they lacked the experience required 
to distinguish important and sometimes subtle clinical cues in 
the first (non-medical) Tier of the RRS.
“When you consider nurses’ experience now [new graduates], 
they might have six months in palliative care and six months 
in rehab. and suddenly they are in another [acute]unit, that’s 
no experience [to deal with some acute situations]. So, they 
don’t feel confident with their decision-making…experienced 
nurses have more confidence to call, a new nurse that has 
spent one rotation in Rehab. with knowledge of the system is 
one thing, but confidence in activating it is another” [RN].
Actions Around System Flexibility Contribute to Deviation 
From Protocol
There was varied understanding amongst participants 
around altering RRS calling criteria, enabling individual 
patient’s parameters to become more or less sensitive to RRS 
activation. Participants viewed that physicians were either 
inappropriately altering the criteria to prevent further RRS 
activation or were in contrast, reluctant to alter the criteria, 
thus, contributing to unnecessary and excessive activation. 
Nurses dissatisfied with medical responses often repeatedly 
activated the RRS as a way of initiating further medical 
review. This behaviour invariably forced physicians to alter 
the RSS criteria to prevent ongoing calls.
“We keep calling a [rapid response] until it resolves, or until 
the criteria gets changed … keep calling it until they change 
it” [RN].
Nurse participants shared their experiences in challenging 
physicians’ decisions to alter RRS calling criteria to unsafe 
levels without appropriate patient assessment, particularly for 
those patients already attracting multiple calls. They labelled 
this a ‘band-aid’ approach, omitting appropriate escalation and 
further investigation into why the breaches were occurring.
“There should be a criteria if there’s multiple [RRS] calls that 
they are reviewed properly, not just continue on for 48 hours 
sitting at those [altered] levels” [RN]. 
Patient safety was a concern for nurse participants, especially 
in relationship to junior physicians altering the RRS calling 
criteria. Despite protocol mandating changes can only be 
made by senior physicians (registrar level and above), junior 
physicians altered criteria at times; a strategy perceived to 
avoid registrar attention. 
“The only one who should change the RRS criteria is the 
Registrar, and that should be done in consultation with the 
team anyway. They [junior physicians] shouldn’t just be 
doing that…” [RN]. 
Also concerning to nurses was the enactment of alterations by 
physicians who were not medically familiar with patients with 
complex medical care needs. In many speciality areas, nurses 
perceived that the RRS physicians were operating outside 
their area of expertise and were, therefore, not cognisant of 
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the specific care needs of some complex specialty patients. 
Not having time to review the patients’ medical records before 
initiating changes to their treatment amplified these concerns. 
It was also perceived that medical records frequently lacked 
adequate detail, context and clarity to enable full, detailed 
assessments and management paths.
“I think it’s unfair for clinicians who aren’t familiar with the 
patient to have to make that decision in such a short period 
of time, and I think it’s a lot of pressure” [RN]. 
Misdistribution of Resources Leads to Perceptions of 
Inadequate Staffing Levels Inhibiting Full Optimisation of the 
Rapid Response System
Introducing the RRS increased participant awareness of 
patient deterioration, but also generated a perception of 
further workload burden. Both nurses and physicians 
expressed concern that the RRS generated an increase in 
workloads, often without any additional resources to assist. 
Fewer staff working ‘after-hours’ meant that clinicians on 
these shifts may be less willing to enact the RRS or to deviate 
from established care plans. 
Confusion over logistical response and over-attendance at 
RRS calls was reported. Such redundancies, perhaps relating 
to a knowledge deficit in protocol, reflect a waste of resources 
and frustration for some. 
“…you don’t need all of the medical staff at every [rapid 
response] a lot of the time the units are so busy, you spend 
a lot of time trying to get through them [tasks], then to put 
down what you are doing, then you go upstairs [to attend the 
call])…” [Junior physician].
Preference to Avoid ‘Crying Wolf ’ Contributes to Complacency 
in Rapid Response System
A portion of RRS calls are ‘false positives’, whereby the 
objective criteria are breached, but the patient is not actually 
deteriorating. This phenomenon has contributed to a level of 
complacency and doubt amongst some clinicians, as depicted 
in the excerpts below: 
“…and you get to the next one and you think, oh I shouldn’t 
rush this, you know, and I think it’s a bit ‘boy who cried 
wolf.’ It’s sort of [rapid response] after [rapid response] 
where you’re not necessarily [needed] and you have another 
couple of flights of stairs, only to be sent away again” [Junior 
physician].
Resource Deprivation and Nurse Empathy Undermine System
Nurse and physician participants attributed strained resources 
to senior physicians’ inability to attend some Tier 2 RRS calls 
‘after-hours.’ 
“There is one [Registrar] in the whole hospital and there 
could be six [rapid response] calls at once, and how can they 
possibly get to six?...It worries me that they’re so stretched, 
that they can’t physically get there” [RN]. 
As a result, nurses attempted to delay or avoid adding 
additional workload to already busy physicians. 
“Often it’s sort of ‘well we need to stop having to call the 
doctor,’ ‘cause the Dr looks like he’s frustrated and annoyed, 
and the nurse doesn’t want to call him,’ and that kind of 
undermines the system at times” [RN].
This perceived pressure on human resources led to RNs 
feeling torn between protocol-mandated escalation and 
feeling responsible for creating extra workload for colleagues.
Poor Communication and Documentation Increases Clinician 
Workloads
Participants suggested that inadequate communication, 
unclear or lack of documented nursing or medical 
management plans, and/or no record or clinical handover 
of a RRS impacted adversely on patient’s subsequent care. 
Several participants reported that overnight RRS events were 
not discussed during handover/rounds because either RRS 
documentation was not prominently displayed in the medical 
records, or senior members of the patients admitting team 
were not aware that a RRS call had been initiated. 
“They [night shift physicians] are generally meant to find the 
home teams in the morning and give them a rundown of 
what’s happened...if that patient has been handed-over, you 
should probably prioritize them first, um but I don’t see that 
always happening” [Junior physician].
Participants attributed the omission of these vital details to 
the limited time available to physicians to convey a large 
volume of information.
“So do you raise it? [the fact that the patient has had a rapid 
response call] [Moderator].
 “That would be fantastic for 1 in 30 patients, but it’s hard on 
4 hour rounds to keep saying ‘what about this, what about 
this’ when like you’re flat out ordering, doing this, doing 
that. It’s a gap…not much time to say what about this [rapid 
response] call here?” [Junior physician].
When it worked well, clinical handover involved routine team 
discussions of events, including RRS activations, and involved 
meetings between shifts, ensuring each team member had an 
understanding of relevant events and plans. 
“The other really good thing is that the [rapid response] calls 
are handed over in the medical handover at five o’clock when 
we meet before the after-hours shift. That brings attention to 
the patients that are unwell, everyone’s got it written down 
on a piece of paper, everyone kind of knows a little bit about 
the history of the patient which makes it easier” [Junior 
physician].
In some units, integrating RRS call details into unit rounds 
prioritised patient management for the day. 
“…When you see them on the unit round in the morning, 
you look at their overnight events…like it’s the first thing you 
do when you’re assessing your patient… it’s just your normal 
practice” [Junior physician]. 
This variability highlights diversity in practice despite 
working within the same systems.
Participants discussed how inadequate technological tools, 
such as information management systems, were contributing 
factors to communication barriers and variation in handover 
practices. They believed that establishing better ways of 
identifying patients who received RRS calls or had calling 
criteria modified, would lead to better clinical handover and 
prioritisation of sicker patients on rounds. The following 
excerpt depicts one participant’s description of sharing 
information as being reliant on clinician memory and note 
taking in the absence of appropriate electronic tools. 
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“As far as I am aware, there is no formal list or computer-
based system, [rather] it’s a matter of people noting it 
down and taking a sticker [containing patient details] and 
presenting it at the handover. I think that works relatively 
well, it’s not very formal.” [Junior physician].
Although described as adequate by participants, this manual 
system of RRS had the potential to miss identifying priority 
patients and those needing monitoring more closely. 
Completion of documentation of altered criteria was on 
single, loose paper forms placed in the front of patient’s 
bedside medical records alongside vital sign observation 
charts. Clinicians discussed how these forms have at times 
become misplaced or difficult to locate if not in the correct 
location every time, potentially resulting in unnecessary RRS 
due to poorly documented changes.
“The altered [rapid response] calling criteria forms can get 
lost. If there was a better way of identifying patients who had 
an altered [rapid response call criteria]” [RN].
RRS entries in the patient’s medical record were sometimes 
overlooked as they ‘blended’ with other entries. Participants 
discussed using ‘flags’ in patients’ medical records to ensure 
high visibility of RRS entries. The effect of poor, incomplete, 
misplaced or out-dated documentation around RRS 
deterioration and altered calling criteria disabled management 
plans, ultimately influencing other clinicians’ workloads. 
These issues created greater obstacles for after-hours RNs 
and physicians who sought guidance from admitting medical 
team documentation. Responding to after-hours RRS calls 
for patients who had already breached criteria during the day 
was reportedly frustrating for physicians when appropriate 
alterations had not been undertaken in a timely manner. 
“I’d just like to reiterate about getting the [admitting] team 
to actually make more management plans for the patient…I 
see the frustration on the regular night nurses’ faces because 
we had to [rapid response] this patient again, oh and … 
again, and it’s like why can’t we do something about that?...I 
think it would be great for the team[s] to have a very clear 
[documented] plan about what they want for their patients 
during out-of-hours” [Junior physician].
The above excerpt reflects the need for routine review and 
detailed documentation of management plans. Failure to do 
so creates frustration and increased work for other clinicians 
with the potential to jeopardise patient safety. Both nurses 
and physicians commented on their regular workloads and 
responsibilities being sidelined to attend RRS calls. 
“I have had situations when working a very busy shift where 
you have [rapid response] calls going off …where you are 
supposed to attend, where you don’t get any of your work 
done that night, and then you hand over to the next people 
this huge list of which, really, you could have done because 
you really weren’t needed at those things [rapid response]” 
[Junior physician].
The above excerpt illustrates the impact of poor documentation 
of patient management plans on the ability of subsequent 
clinicians to meet their workload demands. 
Discussion
This study highlighted multiple factors influencing clinician’s 
abilities to operate effectively within the RRS environment. 
Protocol deviation was evident to varying degrees by both 
disciplines, though as reported in the literature, it is not a 
unique observation that nurses are more likely to adhere to 
protocols than physicians,31 perhaps a manifestation of their 
professional training and views of role and scope of practice. 
This reflected consistently with nurses seemingly having 
greater understanding of the RRS process than their medical 
colleagues.
The study, however, revealed potential reasons for the 
occurrence of some protocol deviation. The initial information 
given at commencement of employment pertaining to the 
RRSs structure and process was less likely to be retained by 
physicians than nurses. Though both disciplines received 
identical education, senior nurses and clinical nurse educators 
in the clinical setting were essential in ensuring embedment 
of RRS knowledge and operation within the nurse culture. 
In contrast, an absence of ongoing support, training and 
evaluation of physician’s roles in the RRS was a key finding 
and influenced functioning within the RRS. 
While a primary aim to involve and up-skill the patients’ 
admitting teams, barriers pertaining to the study sites’ model 
type were evident. Relying solely on admitting medical teams 
(and over-extended after-hours physicians) for primary tier 
medical response, at times, translated to an inconsistent 
and desultory RRS. Physicians, still in various stages of 
training, participate in these response roles for short periods, 
limiting both development into the role and establishing 
peer relationships with nurses from other clinical units. This 
inconsistent exposure was further complicated by a need to 
orientate large numbers of physicians into the responder role 
without support of a targeted, formal curriculum. 
Existing literature discusses failures of RRS,13,32,33 yet studies 
seem scarce on examining the direct effectiveness between 
a variety of efferent (response) limbs models, tending to 
generically conclude suitability should be based on individual 
healthcare facilities goals and resources.13 While many options 
exist around composition and resourcing of RRTs, pros and 
cons are evident regardless of choice. ICU without walls34,35 is 
one concept that utilises the expertise of a trained critical care 
physician or team. Its small, targeted group make-up would 
enable easier training into rapid response roles. It would 
also lend to more consistent exposure to other acute areas 
of the hospital, theoretically supporting more effective peer 
relationship development outside the ICU. Similarly, MET’s 
and ICU Nurse Liaison models36 would have correlative 
benefits. While perhaps not encouraging the ‘enabled’ up 
skilling of non-critical care clinicians to the same degree as 
admitting team models, they do afford greater opportunity 
for consolidation of RRS skill and role development. 
The admitting team model was not unsuccessful in identifying 
and managing deterioration, the study participants engaged 
the system, though model design did cause discord around 
understanding and the perceived availability, functionality 
and efficiency of appropriately positioned resources. It was 
apparent the deployment of resources used in any RRS is a 
major factor when determining implementation and ongoing 
system success. Investigation into RRS team composition and 
resourcing6 found that teams operated 24 hours a day, yet only 
25% were funded, meaning resources were stripped from one 
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area to service another. This no doubt causes extra burden on 
clinicians left to cover redundant positions during that time 
and can result in multiple forms of deviation of protocol as 
evidenced in this study. 
There was discussion amongst participants around METs 
being a better option for the facility, who cited physician 
training, knowledge and workload as the main reasons for 
efficient processes. RRT makeup is still contentious within 
the literature with some studies showing the importance of 
physician inclusion,37 while others show beneficial results of 
nurse led ICU liaison/critical care outreach.36,38 
The nursing unit team environment played an important role 
in support and ongoing re-enforcement of RRS utilisation. 
Additionally, two nurses noted the system’s ability to 
provide statistical evidence of workload and patient acuity. 
This evidence can help to highlight discrepancies between 
workforce supply and demand. 
Physicians’ experiences reflected managing multiple 
competing demands, learning at various institutions with 
differing systems, and accelerated advancement to team 
member roles within the RRS. These topics were of greater 
concern in the junior physician groups where most agreed. 
Unlike nurses, these physicians do not have large support 
teams with senior colleague (consultant level) and educator 
guidance. This appears to be repeated nationally6 and is 
accentuated in situations of patient deterioration where 
consultant physician level guidance and support would be 
of most benefit. As many of these individuals are training 
for specialties there are anxieties about competencies and 
further opportunities.39,40 This may have lent to situations 
of escalation avoidance witnessed by nurses, who believed 
physicians needed to be seen as being able to manage and 
were not comfortable with patients deteriorating ‘under their 
watch.’
Efferent limb response demands more than just high-level 
skills in clinical assessment and management. Effective RRS 
implementation requires stronger development in responder 
role clarity and effective teamwork, yet there is often limited 
attention to this critical dynamic, both within the team and 
between peer relationships.41 The rapid response physician 
is required to enter unknown situations, while often 
unfamiliar with the patient or specialty, communicate with 
colleagues from different disciplines, make clinical decisions, 
frequently change the management of what is seen as ‘another 
team’s patient’ and take responsibility for the change. This 
responsibility imposes significant burden on physicians, many 
of who are relatively inexperienced. The study provides strong 
support for responder development of the non-technical 
clinical skills required to effectively perform within RRS 
roles; in particular, advanced communication, leadership, and 
teamwork being primary assets. 
Future research should focus on investigating the impact 
and efficacy of differing RRS model types. Of particular 
interest, a focus on the impact of differing responders, their 
professional composition, level of seniority and area of origin 
on influencing optimal rescue of deteriorating patients. The 
impact each has on existing staffing and resources would also 
be invaluable in helping already overloaded clinicians cope 
with further demands of these and other imposed systems. 
Ongoing development and evaluation of RRS team training 
is also required to ensure responding clinicians are confident 
and capable, not only with clinical skills, but also with ability 
to work in teams and effectively lead in what are, quite 
commonly, difficult circumstances for patients, families and 
fellow clinicians. Literature is still scant on the development 
of training specifically aimed at RRTs. Initial evidence 
from investigators such as Theilen et al42 show promising 
advantages in weekly multi-disciplinary simulation training, 
citing responder supportiveness and clinical, teamwork 
and communication skills as essential elements within the 
curricula. Large multi-centre studies to help support this 
evidence are required to ensure both simulation and training 
content are the most effective ways to train our RRTs. 
Within the study site, improvements in technology are 
developing to aid clinicians with patient management. 
Electronic activation and documentation of RRS calls will 
prompt clinicians to better document patient clinical events 
and management plans while also allowing for integration 
of this information to other systems. Production of clinical 
handover alerts of these patients to proceeding shifts of 
clinicians for example, enables identification of patients 
most at risk, allowing for prioritization of rounding and 
closer observation. The advancement and increasing use 
of technologies such as these, continuous smart vital sign 
monitors with automated RRS activation, and technologies 
allowing patient bedside point of care recording, will all add 
to future tools for clinicians, assisting in patient deterioration 
prevention through swifter, more accessible and adaptable 
information. Add to this, increasing advancements in 
integrated health records allowing continuation of patient 
information between primary and acute health facilities. 
Limitations 
Generalisability of this study is limited due to the single 
site. Some participant demographics are absent as a result 
of participants not supplying all information. The self-
report and recall nature of this study is a limitation, but 
the qualitative approach has allowed elucidation of critical, 
nuanced factors influencing system implementation and 
ongoing optimisation. 
Conclusion 
Study participants viewed the use of the RRS overall as an 
enabling tool for keeping patients safe, but also highlighted 
discrepancies and weaknesses exist in the system, particularly 
around choice and distribution of resourcing. The ways in 
which clinicians operated within this system was complex, 
multifactorial and non-standardised, sometimes with 
unintended consequences. 
This study adds to an emerging body of data emphasising 
the importance of considering local, contextual factors, as 
well as model elements.43 Workplace processes, cultural and 
professional factors and systems are important considerations 
in implementation of RRSs. Failing to consider teamwork, 
communication and inter-professional dynamics impede 
activation of critical elements of the RRS.
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